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When spouses, civil union partners, or de facto partners separate the 
focus in any ensuing relationship property proceedings is naturally 
on the property rights of the parties to the relationship. As s 1C of the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 explains:
This Act is mainly about how the property of married couples and civil 
union couples and couples who have lived in a de facto relationship is 
to be divided up when they separate or one of them dies. 
The use of the word “mainly” indicates that the Act is not solely 
concerned with the property rights of spouses and partners. The interests 
of children of the relationship, in particular, are relevant and must be 
taken into account. These interests are of such significance that they 
feature as one of the purposes of the Act in s 1M(c): 
to provide for a just division of the relationship property between the 
spouses or partners when their relationship ends by separation or death, 
and in certain other circumstances, while taking account of the interests of 
children of the marriage or children of the civil union or children of the de facto 
relationship. (emphasis added)
Section 26(1) gives explicit effect to the Act’s purpose in relation to 
minor or dependent children of the relationship by directing the court to 
have regard to their interests in any proceedings under the Act. So, while 
the main purpose of the Act is to divide the relationship property of the 
spouses or partners, a just division must take account of the interests of 
minor or dependent children of the relationship.1 Section 1M(c) is not 
confined to minor or dependent children. It is capable of applying to all 
children of the relationship. 
Yet, in spite of the Act’s stated purpose and the mandate in s 26(1), 
children’s interests, including those of minor or dependent children, 
have not played a prominent role in relationship property proceedings.2 
To the extent that children’s needs and interests require protection, the 
courts have generally adopted a minimalist approach to avoid depriving 
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the parties of their relationship property entitlements. In proceedings 
concerned with the division of property between the two parties to 
the relationship, the focus on the parties’ rights may even deprive the 
children of beneficial interests in property legally owned by the parties. 
That risk is greater when the children are young or dependent and not 
in a position to safeguard their own interests. Because the proceedings 
are between the parties to the relationship, the children’s perspective is 
not before the court unless it assists a party’s case or the court realises 
that the children’s interests are in jeopardy. 
This paper has two aims. Its first aim is to alert readers to the range 
of property interests that children may have in assets owned by the 
parties to the relationship and how they might be better protected. 
Taking account of children’s interests goes well beyond identifying 
their property interests. Section 26(1) requires children’s interests to be 
considered whenever relationship property matters are addressed. This 
mandate acknowledges the adverse effect that a division of relationship 
property may have on children of the relationship. Accordingly, the 
second aim of this paper is to consider the extent to which children’s 
interests are taken into account and whether there is scope to give better 
effect to this duty. 
II Preliminary comments
Before embarking on the substantive discussion, three preliminary 
comments must be made. The first is that the current Act is no minor 
amendment of the old Matrimonial Property Act 1976. Although the 
2001 Act is in the form of an amendment, it significantly reforms the core 
provisions of the 1976 Act. Even seemingly minor changes to sections 
have wide ranging ramifications, often going well beyond the amended 
section. Some of the consequences may not have been envisaged or even 
intended by the legislature. The legislative process does not suggest that 
Parliament considered the Act’s reforms in a holistic manner. Given the 
scope and nature of the reforms, it is important to treat jurisprudence and 
commentary developed under the old Act with caution.3 Even provisions 
that are substantively unchanged call for a fresh perspective to ensure 
the amended Act is given its full effect and its impact on children of the 
relationship is carefully considered. 
The second preliminary comment is that the Act is social legislation, 
capable of responding to changing societal values and socio-economic 
circumstances. Three relevant changes in the past two decades are the 
unparalleled use of trusts, New Zealand’s ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1993 and the Global 
Financial Crisis. Family trusts often place significant family assets outside 
3 In her keynote address to the Family Court Judges’ triennial conference 
in 2011, Elias CJ questioned whether the bench was being too deferential 
to precedent, which was detracting from a fresh look in response to the 
2001 amendments.
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the ambit of the Act. Attempts to bring those assets within the scope 
of the Act reflect the expectations of parties to the relationship and a 
growing belief in society that those expectations are reasonable.4 But 
those attempts may well come at the expense of the interests and even 
the rights of children of the relationship. 
New Zealand’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child acknowledges its general endorsement of the rights articulated 
in the Convention. Articles 3, 12 and 27 are particularly relevant to 
relationship property proceedings. They deal with the child’s wellbeing, 
the child’s right to be heard, and the child’s living conditions. While the 
Convention has not been adopted into domestic law, the courts do take 
note of it, particularly in care proceedings, and they construe domestic 
legislation to accord with the Convention.5 In the context of relationship 
property proceedings, however, the Convention is rarely mentioned.6 
The need to consider international and domestic obligations is especially 
acute in a Global Financial Crisis. When finances are stretched, children 
are more likely to be adversely affected by a property division. These 
socio-economic changes call for a revised approach to the Act’s property 
sharing regime. 
The third comment relates to the Act’s wide meaning of “child of a 
marriage” and other relationships covered by the Act.7 It includes not 
only a child of both parties to the relationship, but also any other child, 
whether or not a child of either spouse or partner, if the child was a 
member of the family of the spouses or partners when their relationship 
ended. In GM v JL the Court held that to qualify as a “child” for purposes 
of the Act, the child must be wholly or partially dependent on one or both 
of the parties to the relationship for physical, material, emotional or social 
support.8 To qualify as a “member of the family” the child must have 
some presence in or belonging to the couple’s household. The definition 
therefore includes stepchildren, foster children and whangai living with 
the couple on a part time or full time basis. In the case of shared parenting, 
the child might be a member of more than one household and qualify 
as a child of more than one relationship. 
Conversely, children of either or both parties to the relationship 
who have no presence in the parties’ household are not children of the 
4 Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts – A Trusts Act for New Zealand 
(NZLC R 130, 2013) at 232 and case law and commentary discussed in III 
B 4 below.
5 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA): K v P [2004] 2 
NZLR 421.
6 Hislop v Hislop (2004) 23 FRNZ 710 and DPC v PMB [2013] NZFC 1105 
are rare examples where the Convention was referred to as part of the 
justification for making orders relating to the home in the interests of the 
children. The latter case cites the earlier version of this paper mentioned 
in the opening footnote. Skellern, note 2, argues persuasively that New 
Zealand is in breach of its obligations under the Convention.
7 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2.
8 GM v JL (2005) 24 FRNZ 835.
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relationship. On a literal construction of the definition, their interests do 
not have to be taken into account in the parties’ relationship property 
proceedings, not even if they are minors or dependent. Fortunately, the 
courts have not excluded consideration of those children’s interests.9
In this paper, unless the context requires otherwise, the term “child” 
is used to include both a child of the relationship and a child of either of 
the parties to the relationship who is not a child of the relationship. In 
the cases relied on in this paper the children were all offspring of one or 
both of the parties to the relationship. For the sake of convenience, the 
term “parents” may be used even where one of the parties is a stepparent.
III Protecting children’s property interests
The starting point in any relationship property claim is to determine 
what property each of the parties owns. The Property (Relationships) 
Act applies only to property beneficially owned by the parties to the 
relationship. The definition of “property” in s 2 came from the Property 
Law Act 1952. It includes real and personal property, any estate or 
interest in such property, any debt or thing in action, and any other right 
or interest. The term “owner” is defined as “the person who, apart from 
this Act, is the beneficial owner of the property under any enactment or 
rule of common law or equity”.10 As both definitions draw on the general 
law, Parliament must have intended property ownership to be given its 
ordinary legal meaning, rather than any special meaning. That is how, 
for the most part, the courts have construed and applied the terms.11
A	 Protecting	children’s	beneficial	ownership	of	property
When ascertaining what property the parties own, it is not uncommon 
for one of the parties to claim that a third party is the beneficial owner 
of some item of property, for example a parent or a child. Usually one of 
the parties to the relationship asserts the claim. In Sydney v Sydney, for 
example, where Graham Sydney’s second wife claimed that the family 
chattels included his art work displayed in the home, Mr Sydney argued 
successfully that he held one of the paintings, valued at $120,000, on 
trust for his children from his first marriage.12 After he had completed 
the work in 1992, he told his first wife that the painting was for their 
children and that he would hold on to it until they reached adulthood. 
That statement did not constitute a gift, because there was no actual or 
constructive delivery of the painting.13 But the statement sufficed as a 
9 In Public Trust v Whyman [2004] NZFLR 688, for example, the minor 
children of the deceased were not children of his relationship with his 
de facto partner. Yet, their interests were the sole reason for the Public 
Trust seeking to bring relationship property proceedings.
10 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2.
11 Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA), where the ordinary meaning of 
a discretionary interest in a trust was applied.
12 Sydney v Sydney [2012] NZFC 2685.
13 Williams v Williams [1956] NZLR 970.
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declaration of trust. It met the three certainties required for a valid trust: 
certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects. 
As Mr Sydney did not beneficially own the painting, it was excluded 
from the pool of relationship property.14
In that case Mr Sydney was looking out for his children’s interests in 
the relationship property proceedings following the breakdown of his 
second marriage. The infant daughter in L v P was not so lucky.15 Mr L and 
Ms P lived together for about 4 years between 2001 and 2006 (excluding 
two periods of separation). In January 2002 Mr L bought a home and 
registered it in his own name. The $285,000 purchase price was funded 
by a mortgage of $200,000 and the balance from his separate property. 
In November 2002 the couple’s daughter, K, was born. The following 
year Mr L’s sister died. She left the residue of her estate equally to L and 
K, with K’s share to be invested by L until her 18th birthday. In June 2004 
Mr L received just under $288,000 from his sister’s estate on behalf of 
himself and K. Instead of investing K’s half share (about $144,000), he 
used $248,000 of the inherited funds to pay off the mortgage and make 
improvements to the home. The rest of the inheritance was untraceable. 
When the couple separated in 2006 Mr L continued to occupy the family 
home while Ms P moved into rented accommodation with K. Ms P 
claimed a half share of the home, which by then had increased in value 
to $460,000. 
When the matter first came before the Family Court, Ms P wanted 
the Court to determine the parties’ relationship property entitlements 
without having regard to any rights or claims that K might have as a 
result of her father’s misappropriation of her inheritance. Ms P intimated 
that she intended to bring proceedings against Mr L in the High Court to 
deal with his misappropriation. The Family Court rejected that approach. 
In carrying out its primary function of ascertaining and dividing 
relationship property it could not ignore that a very substantial sum, 
to which neither Ms P nor Mr L were entitled, had been absorbed into 
their primary asset, the family home, to their significant advantage.16 
In view of K’s infancy and her parents’ attitude towards her inheritance, 
the Family Court appointed independent counsel to represent K and 
protect her interests.17 The question was what sort of interest or claim K 
had and how best to protect it. As both the Family Court and the High 
Court concluded, the answer lay in the equitable remedies for breach 
of trust.18
14 See also M v M FC Manukau FAM-2006-092-3020, 22 June 2009.
15 L v P HC Auckland CIV-201-404-6103, 17 August 2011; on appeal from 
DP v UL FC North Shore, FAM-2007-044-000882, 17 August 2010. 
16 DP v UL FC North Shore, FAM-2007-044-000882, 17 August 2010 at [29].
17 Section 37A Property (Relationships) Act 1976 provides for appointment 
of a lawyer to represent a child of the relationship if special circumstances 
exist to make the appointment necessary or desirable.
18 This case is discussed by Jessica Palmer and Nicola Peart in “Trust 
principles overlooked” [2011] NZLJ 423.
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As a trust beneficiary, K had the right to trace her misappropriated 
inheritance into whatever assets her parents had acquired with the 
funds. As a proprietary claim by K would affect her parents’ relationship 
property pool, determining the extent of K’s interest was within the 
Family Court’s jurisdiction.19
The first question was whether the $40,000 that was untraceable 
should be allocated to K or her father. In other words, how much of K’s 
inheritance was used to repay the mortgage. The Family Court and the 
High Court came to opposite conclusions on this point. 
The Family Court held that all of K’s inheritance had been used on the 
home, thus allocating the untraceable funds entirely to Mr L. Although 
the Court did not refer to any trust law authority, its approach accorded 
with conventional tracing principles where trust money is mixed with 
the trustee’s own money.20 Any withdrawals from such a mixed fund that 
are untraceable are attributed to the trustee and any withdrawals that 
are traceable into another fund or asset can be claimed as trust property. 
This approach protects the vulnerable beneficiaries and prevents trustees 
from profiting from their wrongdoing. Ms P objected to the effect that 
this ruling had on her relationship property entitlement and appealed 
the decision.
The High Court upheld her appeal, disagreeing with the Family Court’s 
approach to K’s tracing claim. It held that for purposes of assessing the 
rights as between Mr L and Ms P, any adverse consequences of Mr L’s 
breach should be visited fully upon Mr L before any were visited on 
Ms P. Mr L was therefore deemed to have first used his own inheritance 
on the home before resorting to his daughter’s inheritance. So, all of 
Mr L’s inheritance and only part of K’s legacy was attributed to the 
$248,000 spent on the home. K was left to pursue her father personally 
for the balance of her misappropriated inheritance. 
This approach does not accord with conventional tracing principles. 
While the assumption in a mixed fund that a trustee withdraws his 
own funds first before drawing on trust funds reflects the principles 
stated in In re Hallett’s Estate, those principles were varied in Re Oatway 
to avoid trustees profiting from their wrongdoing at the expense of the 
beneficiaries.21 The High Court did the opposite. It allowed Mr L to 
profit at K’s expense and left her vulnerable to the risks of a personal 
claim against Mr L. Furthermore, Ms P’s knowledge of her partner’s 
wrongdoing was never canvassed. Unless she was a bona fide purchaser 
for value without notice of the source of the mortgage repayment, which 
seems unlikely, she was in no better position than Mr L. 
The next question was how to recognize K’s proprietary interest. The 
Family Court deducted the amount it had attributed to K’s inheritance 
19 On the Family Court’s equitable jurisdiction, see Yeoman v Public Trust 
[2011] NZFLR 753 (HC).
20 In re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356.
21 In re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 (CA); In re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356.
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from the value of the house and divided the balance equally between L 
and P. It had no jurisdiction to impose any proprietary remedies to protect 
K’s interest.22 Having acknowledged its jurisdictional limitations early 
on in the proceedings, it is surprising that the Court did not immediately 
transfer the proceedings to the High Court, rather than leaving any 
protection of the child’s interests to the parties or an appeal.23 
There was nothing to prevent the High Court from protecting K’s 
interests. Under its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction it had the power 
and the duty to protect a child at risk, even if the child was not a party to 
the proceedings.24 The Court made an order giving K a beneficial interest 
in the family home to be held by an independent trustee, but left the 
extent of K’s interest to be determined by the parties. In the meantime 
counsel for K was directed to lodge a caveat to protect K’s beneficial 
interest. If the home was sold, K’s share of the proceeds would have to be 
conveyed to the independent trustee. If the home was not to be sold, the 
trustee would have to take title to an appropriate share of the property. 
This order did not appropriately protect K’s proprietary interest either. 
Nor did it address her claim to the untraceable funds. 
There were two complicating factors in K’s tracing claim. The first was 
that some of the funds were used to repay the mortgage while the rest 
was spent on improvements to the home. Neither Court determined 
what portion of K’s funds was used on the mortgage and what portion 
on the improvements. This distinction was relevant to the subject matter 
of K’s proprietary interest. Trust funds used to acquire or improve 
property of the trustee entitle the beneficiary to choose whether to claim 
a proportionate share in the beneficial ownership of the property, or 
take a charge as security for a personal claim against the trustee.25 To the 
extent that K’s funds were expended on improving the house, she was 
entitled to a proportionate share of the home, including the increase in 
value from the date that her funds were used on improvements. 
When trust funds are used to repay a mortgage, the established position 
is that the beneficiary is confined to the rights that the mortgagee had: a 
charge over the property for the repayment of the capital plus interest. 
There is some authority that supports the view that a beneficiary should 
22 In directions made on 14 July 2009 Judge Ryan confirmed that the Family 
Court had no jurisdiction to deal with claims relating to the Trust and 
the child’s inheritance: DP v UL FC North Shore FAM-2007-044-882, 
17 August 2010.
23 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 22 gives the Family Court power to 
transfer the proceedings to the High Court if that is the more appropriate 
venue for dealing with the proceedings because of their complexity. For 
example, KMH v CLH [2012] NZHC 537; [2012] NZFLR 688, where the 
existence of trusts and the likelihood of orders outside the Family Court’s 
jurisdiction justified the transfer. See also the Property (Relationships) 
Amendment Act 2013 which amends s 22 to clarify the range of factors 
relevant to applications for transfer to the High Court.
24 L v P HC Auckland CIV-201-404-6103, 17 August 2011 at [84].
25 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102.
Protecting Children’s Interests in Relationship Property Proceedings
Otago Law Review34 (2013) Vol 13 No 1
be able to claim a share of the beneficial ownership of the asset itself. 
This is known as “backward tracing”. Its availability is controversial.26 
As a substantial proportion of K’s inheritance was used to repay the 
mortgage, the Court order represents a significant departure from the 
established position on tracing. Depending on her parents’ determination 
of her interest, she may gain a greater interest in the property than she 
was entitled to. As a beneficial owner of the home, she would share in 
any increase in value from the date that her inheritance was used to 
repay the mortgage, rather than only receiving interest on the use of her 
capital. In view of the current increase in house prices, it could make a 
significant difference to K’s financial position. 
On the other hand, by leaving it to the parents to determine the extent 
of K’s interest in the home and not protecting her claim to the untraceable 
funds, K was at risk of losing some of her property. The Court’s disregard 
of fundamental principles of trust law thus resulted in a failure to take 
proper account of K’s interests in breach of the mandate in s 26(1).
This case reveals the need for vigilance when ascertaining property 
ownership in a relationship property dispute. When the focus is on the 
relationship property rights of spouses or partners it is easy to overlook 
the property rights of children, particularly if the children cannot speak 
for themselves and their parents do not appreciate the legal consequences 
of their actions. Mr L may have thought he was acting in the best interests 
of his family by using the inheritance to pay off the mortgage on the 
family home. He may even have regarded it as a good investment for 
his daughter, but it was nonetheless a breach of trust. His daughter’s 
interests were jeopardised because her rights as a beneficiary were caught 
up in the relationship property dispute of her parents, neither of whom, 
it seems, could be trusted to protect her interests.
Both L v P and Sydney v Sydney are examples of express trusts. Children 
may also have a constructive trust claim to property legally owned by 
their parents either on the basis of a common intention,27 or the Lankow v 
Rose reasonable expectations test.28 Because of the requirements for this 
type of claim, the children are more likely to be adult and better able 
to protect their interest in relationship property proceedings between 
their parents. 
B	 Protecting	children’s	discretionary	interests	in	trusts
Children are more often beneficiaries of an express discretionary trust, 
in which case they have no property in the trust assets until such time 
as the trustees exercise their discretion in favour of one or more of 
26 LD Smith “Tracing into the payment of a debt” (1995) 54 CLJ 290; Matthew 
Conaglen, “Difficulties with tracing backwards” (2011) 127 LQR 432.
27 Gough v Fraser [1977] 1 NZLR 279 (CA); Potter v Potter [2005] 2 NZLR 
1 (PC); Richardson v Cassin CA 24/03, 27 November 2003 and Harvey v 
Beveridge [2013] NZHC 1718.
28 Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277, (1994) 12 FRNZ 682, [1995] NZFLR 1 
(CA).
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the children.29 But they do have a potential interest and a right to be 
considered.30 The trustees have a corresponding duty to make a genuine 
decision whether to appoint income or capital to one or more of the 
children as part of the trustees’ overall obligation to perform the trust 
honestly and in good faith.31 Trustees must not act capriciously or fetter 
their discretion. When exercising their discretion, they must take into 
account relevant considerations and ignore irrelevant considerations. 
Beneficiaries, including discretionary beneficiaries, have the right to hold 
the trustees to account for the performance of their duties.32 To that end 
beneficiaries have a range of personal and proprietary remedies available 
to enforce the trust.33
Family trusts in New Zealand are commonly settled by one or both 
parents for the benefit of themselves, their children and remoter issue. 
The parents are often trustees, with or without an independent co-trustee, 
and one or both of the parents tend to hold the power to appoint and 
remove trustees. They may also have reserved the power to add and 
remove beneficiaries. In their capacity as trustees, they normally have 
broad discretionary powers to appoint income and capital to any of the 
beneficiaries, including themselves.34 By means of these powers parents 
are perceived to control the trust for their own benefit. While their 
relationship is on foot, their children are likely to share in benefits their 
parents derive from the trust. The children may even benefit directly 
from appointments of income or capital. But when their parents separate, 
the trust is often an obstacle to achieving equality between the parties.
If both parties are trustees and hold the power to appoint and remove 
trustees, they may become deadlocked and unable to agree on the exercise 
of their administrative and dispositive powers.35 Where the trust property 
is occupied by one of the parties, as is often the case when the major trust 
asset is the family home or a farm, the effect of a deadlock is that the 
party in occupation continues to benefit from the trust, while the other 
29 Kain v Hutton [2008] NZSC 61, [2008] 3 NZLR 589; Nation v Nation [2005] 
3 NZLR 46, (2004) 23 FRNZ 783 (CA).
30 Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 (CA); Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 
(CA).
31 Armitage v Nurse  [1998] Ch 241 (CA).
32 Foreman v Kingstone [2004] 1 NZLR 841.
33 They may sue the trustees personally for loss or pursue proprietary 
remedies against the trustees or third party recipients. They may 
also pursue claims against strangers for knowing receipt or knowing 
assistance. But such property or compensation as is recovered reverts to 
the trust. Hence, the most common remedy discretionary beneficiaries 
seek is the removal of trustees on grounds of hostility, failure to perform 
the trust or expediency: Trustee Act 1956, s 51.
34 A clause providing for majority decision-making is commonly inserted 
to avoid trustees making decisions to benefit themselves.
35 Koornneef v Koornneef HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-2444, 8 March 2011; 
KAMG v STG (aka Anderson v Anderson) [2013] NZHC 1767.
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party is excluded.36 The unequal effect is even more pronounced where 
the power to remove trustees is held by only one of the parties, who then 
exercises the power to remove their former spouse or partner as trustee. 
While that avoids a deadlock, it is also very likely to reduce any future 
benefit the former spouse or partner might receive from the trust and 
to create inequality in the parties’ bargaining strengths in negotiations 
to reach a property settlement.37 
Where a trust gives rise to inequality, the disadvantaged spouse or 
partner is likely to look for remedies aimed at accessing the assets held 
in trust in an attempt to share equally in the property associated with the 
relationship. Sections 44 and 44C of the Property (Relationships) Act are 
designed to deal with dispositions that defeat the relationship property 
rights of a spouse or partner. If the parties were married or in a civil 
union, then s 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980 may assist. Where none 
of the statutory remedies achieves the desired outcome, the courts have 
been sympathetic to arguments that the trust assets should be treated 
as beneficially belonging to one or both of the parties to the relationship 
on the basis of their powers to control the trust for their own benefit. 
The difficulty with these remedies and arguments is that they are raised 
in relationship property proceedings where the focus is on giving effect to 
a dominant social policy of equality between parties to a relationship. The 
interests of other trust beneficiaries, including children of the separated 
couple, are subordinated to the policy of equality between the parties, 
even though both the Property (Relationships) Act and the general law 
mandate that children’s interests should be considered and protected in 
whatever way is appropriate.
1 Dispositions intended to defeat rights
Section 44 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 gives the court power 
to set aside dispositions of property that were intended to defeat the 
relationship property rights of a spouse or partner. Prior to the Supreme 
Court ruling in Regal Castings v Lightbody,38 proof of intent required 
evidence of a fraudulent motive or purpose: a conscious desire to remove 
relationship property from the reach of the courts.39 This test rendered 
s 44 of little use. Dispositions to trusts were safe as long as defeating the 
rights of one of the spouses was not the end which the disposition was 
intended to achieve. A disposition intended to benefit children of the 
relationship was not vulnerable under this test, even if it had the effect of 
depriving a spouse or partner of their relationship property entitlement.40
36 For example, Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46, (2004) 23 FRNZ 783 (CA); 
Ward v Ward [2009] NZSC 125; [2010] NZLR 31; Begum v Ali FAM-2001-
004-000866, 10 December 2004.
37 Kilkelly v Arthur Watts Savage Legal HC Invercargill CIV-2006-425-148, 23 
July 2007.
38 Regal Castings v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87; [2009] 2 NZLR 433.
39 Coles v Coles (1987) 3 FRNZ 101; 4 NZFLR 621 (CA) at 105 and 625. 
40 For example, Coles v Coles (1987) 3 FRNZ 101; 4 NZFLR 621 (CA); Gerbic 
v Gerbic (1991) 8 FRNZ 518; [1992] NZFLR 481.
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In Regal Castings v Lightbody, in the context of very similar wording 
protecting creditors in s 60 of the Property Law Act 1952, the Supreme 
Court held that intent did not require a fraudulent motive or purpose. 
Rather, the creditors had to show that the respondents knew or ought 
to have known that by disposing of the property they were significantly 
increasing the risk that the creditors would not be able to recover the 
amounts owing to them. 
This test has since been applied to s 44.41 But the implications of 
this new test in the relationship property context have yet to be fully 
considered. Would a disposition into trust for the benefit of children be 
caught if the transferor knew at the time that it would have the effect of 
defeating the relationship property rights of their spouse or partner? If 
the answer to that question is “yes”, as the Regal Castings test suggests, 
then it will adversely affect the interests of the children for whose benefit 
the offending disposition was made. 
Nonetheless, proving the required intent is still a significant hurdle. 
Knowledge cannot simply be inferred from the effect of the disposition.42 
It must be separately established. That requirement is less likely to 
be satisfied if both spouses or partners disposed of the property, as is 
often the case when couples settle a trust. Section 44 is more likely to 
apply where the property was transferred by one of the parties to the 
relationship. If that party knew at the time that by disposing of the asset 
into trust a future relationship property claim by their spouse or partner 
could be defeated, then the court may well conclude that the disposition 
was made with that intent.
Establishing a fraudulent intent does not necessarily mean that the 
disposition will be set aside. The court may make that order only if the 
transferees received the property otherwise than in good faith and for 
valuable consideration.43 As the party who settled the trust is also often a 
trustee, he or she cannot rely on the defence. The settlor’s co-trustees may 
also know of the settlor’s intent or the settlor-trustee’s knowledge may 
be attributed to them as joint recipients, as in Regal Castings v Lightbody.44
Even if the recipients have no defence to the claim, the court may 
still decline to set aside the disposition. It has a discretion whether to 
grant orders under s 44. It could decline to set aside the disposition if 
41 Ryan v Unkovich [2010] 1 NZLR 434; [2009] NZFLR 948; K v V [2012] NZHC 
1129. See also Perriam v Wilkes HC Auckland CIV-2009-425-284, 18 August 
2011 where the test was applied to s 43 Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
42 Several Family Court decisions, where the Regal Castings’ test was held to 
have been met, were overruled because the intent was not proven: K v V 
[2012] NZHC 1129 overruling AJV v ABGK FC Wellington FAM-2009-085-
1268, 2 December 2011; Patterson v Davison [2012] NZHC 2757, overruling 
CHD v IAP [2012] NZFC 5370. See also Clayton v Clayton [2013] NZHC 
301 where the High Court remitted the matter back to the Family Court 
to identify the evidence in support of the intent requirement.
43 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44(2).
44 Regal Castings v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87; [2009] 2 NZLR 433.
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it was intended to benefit the children of the relationship. The court 
may conclude that the children’s interests outweigh the applicant’s 
relationship property entitlement. 
That was not the case in JCF v DWG, where in a settlement agreement, 
later set aside on grounds of duress and serious injustice, the respondent 
gave his former partner 25 per cent of her entitlement and transferred 
another 25 per cent into a trust for the benefit of their children.45 He 
retained the other half of the relationship property pool and had complete 
control over the trust. As there was no reason to prefer the children over 
the applicant’s rights, nor any justification for protecting the children’s 
interests entirely at the expense of the applicant’s rights, the trustees were 
ordered to transfer the property back to the applicant and respondent 
for equal division between them. 
Section 44(2) gives the court a range of possible orders to remedy an 
offending disposition. The order can be made in favour of the applicant 
spouse or partner or such other person(s) as the court directs. The court 
could make an order in favour of children of the relationship. The order 
may also relate to only part of the disposition or to the value of the 
property rather than the property itself. There is therefore ample scope 
in s 44 to take account of the interests of children, both in relation to 
determining whether to set aside the disposition and how to remedy 
any adverse effect of the disposition. Yet, the case law to date reveals 
little acknowledgement of children’s interests when applying s 44. The 
relationship property rights of the applicant spouse or partner seem to 
dominate at the expense of any interest that the children might have in 
the trust.
2 Dispositions having the effect of defeating relationship property rights
Section 44C Property (Relationships) Act 1976 performs a very different 
function from s 44. Its purpose is not to recover property for purposes 
of classification and division under the Act, but to order the respondent 
spouse or partner to compensate the applicant spouse or partner for 
the unequal effect of the disposition on the rights of the parties. The 
disposition of relationship property must therefore produce an unequal 
benefit as between the parties. Compensation is intended to restore 
equality between the parties in terms of the benefit that each enjoys from 
the disposition of relationship property to the trust. 
Reflecting that purpose, the order is directed in the first instance at the 
respondent spouse or partner, not the trustees who received the property. 
Only if the respondent has insufficient property outside the trust to 
compensate the applicant does the court have power to make an order 
against the trustees, and then only to divert income from the trust to the 
applicant.46 The court has no power to make an order against the capital 
of the trust. The integrity of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries 
45 JCF v DWG [2012] NZFC 5854.
46 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C(3).
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are thus protected, which was Parliament’s intention.47 However, the 
New Zealand Law Commission has recommended an amendment to 
s 44C to allow the court to make orders against the capital of the trust.48 
If that recommendation is accepted, it will jeopardise the integrity of the 
trust and prioritise the interests of spouses or partners at the expense 
of their children and other beneficiaries of the trust. Capital could be 
removed from the trust without constraint on its use or protection against 
it becoming relationship property of a subsequent relationship. 
The court is not obliged to make an order under s 44C. It has a discretion 
to award compensation “if it considers it just to do so”.49 Quantum is also 
at the court’s discretion. In deciding whether to make an order and how 
much compensation to award the court is directed to have regard to a 
range of factors, including whether any children of the relationship are 
or have been beneficiaries of the trust and any other relevant matter.50 
The extent to which the children are or were dependent on the trust 
for support or may be in the future will be an important consideration, 
especially if parental finances are stretched. Unlike s 44 where children’s 
interests are not mentioned, the explicit reference to children in s 44C 
provides some assurance that their interests will be taken into account 
when compensation for a disposition of relationship property is sought 
by one of their parents. To date, however, there is little evidence of 
children’s interests affecting compensation orders in favour of one of 
their parents.
3 Section 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980
Section 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980 gives the court a broad 
discretion to vary a nuptial settlement on the dissolution of a marriage 
or civil union.51 Trusts settled by one or both spouses or civil union 
partners for the benefit of themselves and their children qualify as 
nuptial settlements.52 
Section 182 is one of the few provisions where the interests of children 
play a prominent role. As the Court of Appeal said in X v X:53
47 Government Administration Committee Report on the Matrimonial 
Property Amendment Bill No 109-2 at xii.
48 Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts – A Trusts Act for New Zealand 
(NZLC R 130, 2013) at 232.
49 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C(4).
50 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C(4)(e) and (f). 
51 Section 182 cannot be invoked when a de facto relationship ends. The 
New Zealand Law Commission has recommended that s 182 be amended 
to include de facto relationships and to make separation, rather than 
divorce, the crystalising event: Law Commission Review of the Law of 
Trusts: A Trusts Act for New Zealand (NZLC R 130, 2013) at 239.
52 Ward v Ward [2009] 3 NZLR 336 (CA); Ward v Ward [2009] NZSC 125; 
[2010] NZLR 31.
53 X v X [2009] NZFLR 956 at [52]. See also Williamson v Williamson [1998] 
16 FRNZ 580 and MEF v J-APM [2012] NZFC 7705.
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In the breakdown of a marriage, children are particularly vulnerable to 
changes in material circumstances, and this is recognised in the language 
of s 182, which gives as a possible factor in the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, benefits that may accrue to “the children of the marriage”.
Although s 182 is intended to deal with the property consequences 
on dissolution of a marriage or civil union, it is not part of the Property 
(Relationships) Act and thus not underpinned by the purpose and 
principles of the Act’s equal sharing regime. In Ward v Ward the Supreme 
Court held that s 182 should be used to restore to the greatest extent 
possible the reasonable expectations that the parties had of the settlement 
when it was made.54  In that case the parties expected to benefit equally 
from the trust and so the Court ordered that half of the trust property be 
resettled on a trust for the wife on the same terms as the original trust. 
Rather than ordering the trustees to pay Mrs Ward half of the capital and 
leaving the remainder in trust for the husband, the resettlement put both 
parties on an equal footing and protected the interests of their children 
as beneficiaries of both trusts. 
Since the Supreme Court ruling in Ward v Ward equal division has been 
the exception. In DAM v PRM and LSP v WSP the couples expected the 
land and the farms settled on trust to pass to their children.55 The wives 
expected the trusts to provide them with suitable accommodation and a 
reasonable level of income. They did not expect to receive a share of the 
farmland. In both cases the Court orders reflected their expectations. The 
children’s interests as beneficiaries of the trust were thus safeguarded. 
In some cases the court has made specific provision for the children 
of the marriage by ordering that a percentage of the trust property be 
settled on a separate trust for the children.56 Those trusts can then be 
placed under the control of an independent trustee to avoid ongoing 
conflict between the parents adversely affecting the administration of 
the trust to the detriment of their children.57 
4 General law arguments
The constraints of the statutory remedies has encouraged disappointed 
spouses and partners to look to the general law in an attempt to bring 
assets in a discretionary trust within the beneficial ownership of one or 
both of the parties to the relationship.58 Following an obiter dictum of the 
54 Ward v Ward [2009] NZSC 125; [2010] NZLR 31.
55 DAM v PRM FC Masterton FAM-2008-035-512, 30 March 2011. LSP v WSP 
FC Gore FAM-2007-017-124, 30 May 2011. See also ML-S v RMS and CJ 
[2012] NZFC 6152.
56 Williams v Williams HC Christchurch CIV-2006-409-2948, 1 May 2009; Ord 
v Ord HC Auckland AP66-SW02, 28 March 2003; MEF v J-APM [2012] 
NZFC 7705.
57 X v X [2009] NZFLR 956; MEF v J-APM [2012] NZFC 7705.
58 For example, LAR v DR FC Auckland FAM-2009-004-001627, 19 November 
2009; JG v JBG FC North Shore FAM-2007-044-591, 13 July 2010; Grigson 
v Walker [2012] NZFC 5566.
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Court of Appeal in Walker v Walker, that the powers held by the spouses in 
respect of their trust together with their discretionary interests constituted 
a valuable “package of assets”, the Family Court has sometimes treated 
this package or “bundle of rights” as property in relationship property 
proceedings.59 
At the heart of the “bundle of rights” argument are the powers that 
one or both of the parties have to control the trust for their own benefit. 
The argument has received both judicial and academic criticism for its 
disregard of fundamental trust law principles.60 In the context of this 
paper, the criticism is worth noting for the argument’s disregard of 
children’s interests. The argument is made for the applicant’s personal 
gain and to the detriment of the children and other beneficiaries of the 
trust. If the argument succeeds, the value of the bundle of rights is treated 
as beneficially belonging to one or both of the parties and included in 
the relationship property pool for division between the parties. 
Central to the criticism of the bundle of rights argument is its exclusive 
focus on the settlors’ powers. The reasoning ignores the obligations 
on the trustees to use those powers honestly and in good faith in the 
interests of all beneficiaries, any one of whom has the right to enforce 
the obligations owed to them. 
The same criticism can be levelled at various unorthodox attempts 
to challenge the existence of trusts.61 In Clayton v Clayton, for example, 
the High Court held that one of the trusts declared by Mr Clayton was 
“illusory”.62 As the sole trustee and one of the discretionary beneficiaries 
and with a clause expressly permitting him to benefit from the trust, Mr 
Clayton had the power to do whatever he wanted with the trust property 
according to the Court. What he had in fact done was neither here nor 
there. Nor did it matter that he intended to establish a trust for legitimate 
business reasons and that his efforts were not a sham. It was the powers 
he had retained, which allowed him to deal with the trust property just 
59 Walker v Walker [2007] 2 NZLR 261(CA); JG v JBG FC North Shore 
FAM-2007-044-591, 13 July 2010; R v R [2010] NZFLR 555 (FC); LR v JR 
(A Bankrupt) [Relationship property: Bundle of rights] [2011] NZFLR 797.
60 For example, Heath J “Some thoughts on a (New Zealand) judicial 
approach to trust law”, paper presented at STEP New Zealand Conference 
in 2012; Shelley Griffiths, “Valuing ‘bundles of rights’ for the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976: when neither art not science is enough” (2011) 
7 NZFLJ 98; Nicola Peart, Mark Henaghan and Greg Kelly, “Trusts and 
relationship property in New Zealand” (2011) 17 Trusts and Trustees 
866; Anthony Grant in several articles in NZLawyer. For a contrasting 
viewpoint see Frances Gush “The ‘bundle of rights’ – Unraveling trust 
principles” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 157.
61 Harrison v Harrison (2008) 27 FRNZ 202 (HC) where the Court held that 
the retention of powers meant that the parties had not separated the 
equitable estate from the legal estate. In B v X [2011] 2 NZLR 405 (HC) 
the Court held that the powers gave the settlor trustee a general power 
of appointment which was tantamount to ownership of the trust assets.
62 Clayton v Clayton [2013] NZHC 301.
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as he would if the trust had never been created.63 The trust was therefore 
invalid and the assets still belonged beneficially to Mr Clayton.
The Court made no mention of Mr Clayton’s duties as trustee. The 
clear inference is that the Court formed the view that Mr Clayton had 
no duties associated with his powers. If so, then his children, who were 
also beneficiaries of the trust, could not have held their father to account 
for breach of trust if he had chosen to appoint trust property to a non-
object of the trust or if he had invested imprudently. Yet, if the children 
had made such a claim, it seems unlikely that the Court would have 
dismissed it on the basis that the trust did not exist. The Court of Appeal 
has granted leave to appeal this decision, as it did in two other cases 
where similar arguments were made.64 The Court hinted in one of the 
leave decisions that it did not approve of the High Court’s disregard for 
the formal structure, but the case settled before the appeal was heard.65 
To the extent that these sorts of arguments depart from established 
legal and equitable principles for which the Property (Relationships) 
Act makes provision in its definitions of property ownership, there 
is no justification to ignore legitimate property structures in order to 
bring property into the relationship property pool. Both the definition 
of ownership in s 2 of the Act, mandating the application of general 
law, and the duty to take account of the interests of children of the 
relationship in s 1M(c) and s 26(1) militate against the development of 
special exceptions that serve the interests of parties to the relationship 
at the expense of their children. 
By relying on the general law to define property ownership, Parliament 
must have intended to strike a balance between the social aims of 
the Property (Relationships) Act and the rights of third parties under 
property structures lawfully created by spouses and partners for 
legitimate reasons. That balance is central to the deferred nature of the 
relationship property regime, the protection of third parties (including 
creditors), and the limits imposed on remedies against third party 
recipients of relationship property.
IV Taking account of children’s interests 
Section 26(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act directs the court to 
have regard to the interests of any minor or dependent children of 
the relationship in any proceedings under the Act. That mandate goes 
some way to meeting the obligations in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child to safeguard the child’s wellbeing. The Act also 
gives the court specific powers to make orders for the benefit of minor 
or dependent children. But the direction in s 26(1) is not limited to 
63 Clayton v Clayton [2013] NZHC 301 at [90].
64 Harrison v Harrison [2009] NZCA 68; [2009] NZFLR 687 (CA); D v B & CIR 
[2011] NZCA 474.
65 Harrison v Harrison [2009] NZCA 68; [2009] NZFLR 687 (CA) at [22], [26] 
and [29].
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those powers. It requires the court to consider the interests of minor or 
dependent children against all the claims, rights and entitlements of the 
parties to the relationship. Children’s interests may be relevant to the 
classification, valuation, and division of property even if the children 
have no beneficial interest in the property. Section 1M(c) does not limit 
the relevance of children’s interests to minor or dependent children 
either. Adult children’s interests should also be taken into account, where 
appropriate. Yet, children’s interests tend to receive very little attention 
in relationship property proceedings and, where they do, their interests 
are protected to the minimum extent possible.
A	 Classification	
Classification of the parties’ assets is central to the scheme of the Act, 
as only relationship property is divided between the parties.66 Separate 
property is retained by the owner. 
Sections 8 to 10 provide a set of rules for classifying the parties’ 
assets. At first sight they appear to leave little scope for consideration 
of children’s interests. There is no discretion and children’s interests are 
not mentioned as a factor relevant to classification. On closer analysis, 
however, children’s interests could affect classification. Whether a 
chattel is an heirloom or taonga, for example, will depend not only on 
the chattel’s ancestry, but also on its intended future destination. The 
reason for removing these items from the definition of family chattels 
in s 2, and thus the relationship property pool, is to preserve them for 
future generations.
Similarly, in determining whether property was acquired for the 
common use or common benefit of both parties to the relationship under 
ss 8(1)(d) and (ee), it may be that some property was for the common 
use or benefit of only one of the parties and that party’s children from a 
former relationship. To qualify as relationship property under either of 
those sections, the asset must have been acquired for the common use 
or benefit of both parties. By taking into account the interests of children, 
such assets may be classified as separate property of one of the parties, 
rather than relationship property.
Conversely, children’s interests may be relevant to classifying what 
might otherwise be separate property as relationship property. For 
instance, property acquired from a third party by gift, survivorship, 
inheritance, or from a trust settled by a third party, retains its separate 
property status unless it is intermingled with relationship property.67 
The needs of children may well cause the separate property to become 
intermingled.
So even in the application of seemingly rigid rules, such as those 
governing classification of assets, taking account of the interests of 
66 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 11.
67 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 10.
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children may produce a different outcome from one that overlooks 
those interests.
B	 Valuation	of	property
Section 2G states that the value of property is to be determined at the 
date of hearing, unless the court in its discretion determines otherwise. 
The insertion of ss 18B and 18C in 2001 to deal with post-separation 
actions has significantly constrained the court’s discretion to adjust the 
valuation date. As the High Court noted in JAM v GFM, s 2G creates a 
presumption in favour of a hearing date valuation.68 The Court went 
on to say that the discretion is to be exercised in accordance with and 
subject to any limits arising from the purposes and principles of the Act. 
Yet, it held that “it was not open to the Judge to meet the needs of the 
children by altering the presumed valuation date designed to achieve 
equality between the husband and wife”.69 It was irrelevant that the 
children wanted to stay in the home after their parents separated, which 
was one of several factors that persuaded the Family Court to adopt the 
separation date valuation.70 
The High Court ruling on this point is open to question and diverges 
from rulings in cases predating the amendments in 2001, where children’s 
interests were taken into account.71 While the discretion to opt for a 
different valuation date is narrower than it was before ss 18B and 18C 
were inserted, s 2G does not exempt the court from the duty to have 
regard to the interests of children of the relationship. The exclusion of 
their interests as a relevant factor disregards the duty imposed by s 26(1) 
and one of the stated purposes in s 1M of the Act. Leave to appeal the 
decision has been granted and may clarify the relevance of children’s 
interests to the discretion in s 2G.72
C	 Division	of	relationship	property
In a relationship of more than three years’ duration there is a strong 
presumption that all of the couple’s relationship property will be divided 
equally unless the parties have opted out of the statutory sharing 
regime.73 If they have not contracted out of the Act, there are only a 
few exceptions to the presumption of equal sharing. It does not apply 
to the division of an increase in value of the owner’s separate property 
attributable to the actions of the non-owning spouse or partner.74 The 
presumption can be rebutted if there are extraordinary circumstances 
that make equal sharing repugnant to justice.75 Compensation orders 
68 JAM v GFM [2012] NZHC 290; [2012] NZFLR 469.
69 JAM v GFM [2012] NZHC 290; [2012] NZFLR 469 at [133].
70 JAM v GFM FC Auckland FAM-2006-004-2610. 4 November 2010 at [54].
71 Stephenson v Reidy HC Auckland M16/98, 11 September 1998; Matehe v 
Matehe (1998) 17 FRNZ 343.
72 JAM v GFM [2012] NZHC 2102; [2012] NZFLR 792.
73 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 11 and 21. 
74 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9A(2).
75 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13.
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and orders for the benefit of children, discussed later in this paper, may 
also result in an unequal division of relationship property.
1 Division of increase in value of separate property attributable to actions of 
non-owning spouse or partner
Section 9A(2) converts the increase in value of separate property into 
relationship property if the increase is attributable to the direct or indirect 
actions of the non-owning spouse or partner. The increase in value that 
is so attributable is then divided according to the contributions of each 
spouse or partner to the increase in value.76  This method of division is 
at odds with the philosophy of the Act by requiring a property-based 
approach, rather than one based on contributions to the partnership.77 
But it does allow the interests of others to be accommodated.
In Rose v Rose the Supreme Court held that any increase in value 
resulting from inflation was to be treated as part of the contribution made 
by the owning spouse or partner, because it was related to ownership 
rather than actions of either party.78 The Court did not consider increases 
resulting from actions or contributions of a child of the relationship. 
Unless the child is able to claim a beneficial share of the ownership on 
the basis of those contributions, any increase attributable to the child’s 
actions should be equally allocated to each spouse or partner. The 
justification of ownership does not have the same force when the increase 
is attributable in part to the actions of a child of the relationship, unless 
the child’s actions were remunerated by the owning spouse or partner.
2 Extraordinary circumstances that make equal sharing repugnant to 
justice
Establishing this exception has always been notoriously difficult.79 
A strong message from the Court of Appeal in 1979 about the Act’s 
emphasis on partnership and equality has left very limited scope for 
the application of the extraordinary circumstances’ exception in s 13 of 
the Act.80 The high threshold remains even after the major amendments 
in 2001.81 
76 If the increase in value is attributable to the application of relationship 
property, the increase also becomes relationship property, but it is subject 
to the ordinary presumption of equal sharing: Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976, s 9A(1).
77 Margaret Briggs and Nicola Peart, “Sharing the increase in value 
of separate property under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: a 
conceptual conundrum” (2010) 24 NZULR 1.
78 Rose v Rose [2009] 3 NZLR 1 (SC).
79 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 13.
80 Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97 at 111. Mark Henaghan and Nicola 
Peart, “Relationship Property Appeals in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal 1958–2008: the Elusiveness of Equality” in R Bigwood (ed) The 
Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 
99–149.
81 De Malmanche v De Malmanche [2002] 2 NZLR 838 at [140].
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In view of the emphasis on equality, it is hardly surprising that children’s 
interests have rarely justified a departure from equal division. The recent 
case of WMM v SJM is a rare example where a child’s needs were the 
wife’s main platform for seeking unequal division of a modest pool of 
relationship property.82 The Family Court Judge was not unsympathetic 
to her argument and considered the wife’ reliance on s 13 carefully. She 
had sole responsibility for the care of her severely disabled daughter from 
a former relationship and her own health was poor. She had also used 
$100,000 of an inheritance she had received two years prior to separation 
to purchase a new family home that was better suited to the needs of 
her daughter and the couple’s child. While the Court acknowledged the 
wife’s very difficult circumstances, caused principally by her daughter’s 
high and complex needs that made re-housing a very difficult exercise, 
they were not sufficient to justify prioritizing the daughter’s interests 
over those of the husband. He had supported his stepdaughter financially 
post-separation and, due to his wife’s health problems, resolution of his 
relationship property claim had been delayed for six years throughout 
which the wife had continued to occupy the family home. 
The Court did take account of the respondent’s unusual circumstances 
in setting a late start date for payment of occupational rent, as explained 
below. There were therefore other ways of addressing the child’s needs 
that detracted less from her stepfather’s entitlement. Nonetheless, the 
judgment does not rule out the possibility of a child’s needs being so 
extraordinary that equal division of the relationship property would be 
repugnant to justice, though it is difficult to imagine a more deserving 
case. If the exception applies, division is based on the contributions of 
each party to the relationship. As the care of children of the relationship 
is one of the contributions listed in s 18, it will also be relevant to the 
division under s 13.
3 Compensation orders
There are several provisions in the Property (Relationships) Act that 
give the court discretion to make compensation orders. Sections 15 
and 15A are intended to redress future economic disparity between the 
parties resulting from the division of functions within the marriage. 
Responsibilities for care of the children during the marriage and after 
separation are central to this type of compensation, though difficulties in 
proving the requirements and uncertainty about the formula for assessing 
quantum have deprived these provisions of much of their intended 
remedial purpose.83 Regrettably, Bill Atkin’s concerns about the utter 
confusion and incoherence of these provisions have been borne out.84
82 WMM v SJM [2012] NZFC 5091.
83 X v X [2009] NZCA 399; [2010] 1 NZLR 601.
84 Bill Atkin, “Editorial: Courts trudge through statutory sludge” (2002) 4 
BFLJ 31 and “Economic disparity – how did we end up with it? Has it 
been worth it?” (2007) NZFLJ 299. See also John Caldwell, “Developments 
in dispute resolution and achieving fairness in property division” in Bill 
Atkin (ed) The International Survey of Family Law (2009 edition, Jordan 
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Sections 15 and 15A differ from other compensation provisions in the 
Act in that they address the effects of the relationship on the parties’ 
future earning capacity, whereas the other compensation provisions are 
concerned with inequality in the division of property. Even in property-
focused compensation provisions, children’s interests may affect whether 
compensation is awarded and its quantum. Children feature prominently 
in applications for post-separation contributions under s 18B and, to 
a lesser extent, in applications for post-separation diminution of the 
relationship property under s 18C. 
(a) Post-separation contributions
Section 18B deals with a spouse or partner’s post-separation contributions 
to the relationship. As the care of children of the relationship is the first 
contribution listed in s 18’s definition of contributions to the relationship, 
one might expect this type of contribution to be highly relevant, 
particularly as separation generally brings about a change in child care 
responsibilities. Yet, there was a surprising divergence of opinion as to 
whether and to what extent the care of children should be treated as 
a post-separation contribution.85 In Loader v Loader the Family Court 
thought that the contribution made by a custodial parent after separation 
was offset by that person’s enhanced relationship with the child or 
children.86 Any sacrifices that the parent with primary responsibility 
might make in caring for the children should be addressed through the 
economic disparity provision in s 15.87 
In G v B the Family Court cautioned against some parents’ temptation 
to put in place childcare arrangements with a clear motive of maximizing 
their own financial benefit.88 The Judge went on to say that compensation 
under s 18B might nonetheless be appropriate “where one parent has 
abandoned childcaring responsibilities to the other or quite blatantly 
manipulated his/her financial circumstances so as to avoid proper 
payment of child support”.89 The power should therefore be exercised 
sparingly. G v B was not a case where compensation was appropriate. Mr 
B had at all times been willing to play a full role in the day to day care 
of the children and was paying child support. His lack of involvement 
was entirely due to Ms G’s unilateral decisions and actions.
In Chong v Speller a full bench of the High Court confirmed that post 
separation care of children qualified as a contribution.90 It also seemed 
to take a broader view of the circumstances in which compensation 
might be justified. It held that “care” referred to the non-monetary 
aspects of the contribution. Expenses associated with such care were 
Publishing, Bristol, 2009) 353 at 363.
85 RRH v MMH FC New Plymouth FAM-2005-043-314, 9 February 2006.
86 Loader v Loader [2003] NZFLR 553 at [55].
87 Loader v Loader [2003] NZFLR 553 at [52]–[53].
88 G v B FC New Plymouth FAM-2002-043-245, 1 December 2004 at [51].
89 G v B FC New Plymouth FAM-2002-043-245, 1 December 2004 at [52].
90 Chong v Speller (2004) 24 FRNZ 273. 
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covered by child support legislation. That view was endorsed in JA v 
SNA [Economic Disparity] where the High Court declined Mrs A’s claim 
for post separation expenditure on the children:91
In my view, s 18B is not intended to provide such compensation. The 
section was intended to be a way of providing to a child caring spouse a 
capital sum which recognizes the fact that day-to-day care of the children 
has fallen on one parent by virtue of the separation.
The Court of Appeal confirmed the correctness of this view in X v X, 
declining Mrs X’s application for her care of the parties’ children post-
separation. Section 18B was not to be used as an alternative to regular 
child support provisions. The Court of Appeal then went on to say:92
This is not a case in which Mrs X has been abandoned with sole 
responsibility for the children, or left in a hopeless financial position by 
her sole care of them.
This statement echoes the approach in G v B in limiting the power to 
compensate for post-separation care of children to a narrow range of 
circumstances. 
Conversely, the retention of the family home by the spouse or partner 
with primary responsibility for minor or dependent children is often 
an important consideration in a court’s decision to decline a claim 
for occupational rent by the other spouse or partner. The courts are 
sympathetic to the children’s need for accommodation and their interests 
in not being uprooted from their home immediately after their parents’ 
separation.93 Occupational rent may then be offset against care of the 
children by the spouse or partner who retained use of the home.
The interests of children of the relationship are also often taken 
into account in determining the “relevant period” for post-separation 
compensation. That period runs from the date that the relationship ended 
until the hearing date.94 The courts often shorten the period to give the 
parties time to sort out their immediate needs. Generally, the grace period 
is up to about six months. But in WMM v SJM, referred to earlier in the 
context of s 13, the Family Court allowed the wife a period of four and 
a half years’ grace after separation because of the high and complex 
needs of her daughter from an earlier relationship and her primary 
responsibility for the care of the parties’ daughter.95 The occupation 
rent that she was required to pay her husband was thus reduced to 18 
months rather than the full six years from separation to the hearing date. 
91 JA v SNA [Economic disparity] [2008] NZFLR 297 (HC) at [24].
92 X v X [2009] NZCA 399; [2010] 1 NZLR 601 at  [160].
93 For recent examples, see RSQ v BQ [2012] NZFC 7272 and WMM v SJM 
[2012] NZFC 5091.
94 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 18B(1).
95 WMM v SJM [2012] NZFC 5091.
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(b) Post-separation diminution in value of relationship property
Section 18C differs from s 18B. It is concerned with actions in relation 
to property, whereas s 18B deals with contributions to the relationship.
To come within s 18C, the applicant has to establish that the 
respondent’s deliberate actions or inaction materially diminished the 
value of the relationship property. As compared to s 18B, the case law on 
s 18C is sparse. While the High Court has now clarified that the action 
or inaction must be deliberate, rather than the diminution in value,96 
it has yet to determine what constitutes a “material” diminution and 
what factors might affect the court’s discretion to award compensation. 
Given the property focus of s 18C, the interests of children are less likely 
to be relevant than they are in s 18B. Nonetheless, factors relevant to the 
children might explain the reason for making an investment or failing 
to preserve an existing investment. No clear explanation was given in 
WMM v SJM for the wife’s neglect of the family home that resulted in a 
$5000 drop in its value.97 She was ordered to compensate her husband 
for half the diminution. The wife was suffering from serious physical 
and psychological health issues and had the sole responsibility for her 
severely disabled daughter. Those factors may have affected her ability 
to carry out maintenance on the house to preserve its value, which would 
have been material to the Court’s exercise of discretion. It is also open to 
question whether a $5000 reduction in the value of the home constituted 
a material diminution for purposes of s 18B.
Section 18C applies to the same “relevant period” as s 18B.98 A similar 
approach to the commencement date might therefore be appropriate in 
s 18C claims, particularly where the diminution in value is the result of 
a deliberate inaction. The party responsible for the inaction may have 
needed some time to adjust to the changes resulting from the separation. 
In the few cases where s 18C has been considered thus far, shortening 
the relevant period was not an issue.
V Orders for the benefit of children
Sections 26 and 26A empower the courts to make orders specifically for 
the benefit of minor or dependent children of the relationship. Section 26 
gives the court discretion to settle some or all of the relationship property 
for the benefit of the children, while s 26A allows the court to postpone 
the vesting of some or all of a party’s share in the relationship property if 
immediate vesting would cause undue hardship for a spouse or partner 
with primary responsibility for the care of children of the relationship. 
Furthermore, when considering whether to make an occupation order 
or tenancy order in favour of one of the parties to the relationship, the 
court is mandated to have “particular regard” to the need to provide a 
96 Hutt v Hodge [2007] NZFLR 438; PGO v MAB HC Auckland CIV-2009-
404-7143, 3 September 2010.
97 WMM v SJM [2012] NZFC 5091.
98 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 18C(1).
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home for any minor or dependent children of the relationship.99
A Section 26
Section 26 serves two purposes. Its first purpose is to direct the court 
in any proceedings under the Act to have regard to the interests of any 
minor or dependent children of the relationship. The second purpose 
is to empower the court to settle relationship property for the benefit 
of children of the relationship, which Heath J construed to refer only to 
minor or dependent children.100 Such an order overrides any agreement 
the parties may have made under Part 6 of the Act. The fact that the 
parties cannot contract out of s 26 emphasizes the importance of 
children’s interests in the division of relationship property.
The power to settle property for the benefit of children could be used 
to displace totally the property rights and claims of the parties to the 
relationship.101 Cooke J, as he was in 1983, observed that the power should 
not be used lightly, but that its presence showed that an inflexible pattern 
was no part of the legislative philosophy.102 
His Honour need not have feared that the power would be used 
frequently or in a radical way. Quite the opposite! A search of Briefcase 
and LexisNexis databases on s 26 applications reveals that orders settling 
property on the children were made in only 14 out of 45 cases. The courts 
were reluctant to embrace this power out of concern that it was being 
invoked simply to avoid equal division of the relationship property.103 
Although the power is not constrained by any statutory criteria or 
guidelines, the courts have generally adopted a very restrictive approach 
by insisting on evidence of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, 
such as criminal offending within the family or severe parental neglect.104 
In R v R Judge Adams presented 10 propositions of relevance to s 26 
applications:105
(1)  Prima facie the matrimonial property is to be regarded as the 
property of the parties.
(2)  In every case where there are minor or dependent children the Court 
is obliged to have regard to the respective interests of each such 
child.
99 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 27, 28 and 28A.
100 In Babylon v Babylon (2009) 27 FRNZ 622 at [76].
101 Walker v Walker [1983] NZLR 560 (CA). 
102 Walker v Walker [1983] NZLR 560 at 565.
103 Coxhead v Coxhead [1993] 2 NZLR 397; Evans v Evans FC Whangarei 
FP29/94, 17 January 1996; Bradwell v Kennedy HC Wellington CIV-2004-
485-611, 23 March 2005.
104 RN v RN (1985) 3 NZFLR 694; R v R [1998] NZFLR 611; (1998) 17 FRNZ 75. 
Priestley J noted this approach to s 26 applications in Hammond v Hardy 
[2007] NZFLR 910.
105 R v R [1998] NZFLR 611 at 622. These propositions have since been referred 
to with approval, for example, in R v R [2007] NZFLR 177.
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(3)  The context of the consideration of the welfare and interests of the 
children is “In the light of the property division between husband and 
wife, to ensure their financial protection during minority or dependency” 
(per Casey J in Rhodes (supra) – I note also the discussion of s 26 by 
His Honour Judge Inglis QC in Wheeler v Wheeler (1984) 2 NZFLR 
385).
(4) The Court is not precluded from considering the interests of adult 
children and may have jurisdiction under s 26 to settle property 
for the benefit of an adult child (Voorburgh (supra); Roberts (supra); 
Lockie v Lockie (1993) 11 FRNZ 81).
(5) It will be the exceptional case where the consideration leads to an 
actual award for a child.
(6) It would be a wrong principle to use s 26 to anticipate succession.
(7) Default or inability of a parent to provide appropriate maintenance, 
upbringing, shelter or nurture for a child are relevant factors, 
whether or not the default is wilful.
(8) In the general run of cases a s 26 order should not be used to 
substitute or supplement child support arrangements. Nonetheless 
the Court’s discretion is unfettered by statute.
(9) Section 26 is not a backhanded means of providing damages to a 
child for ordinary parenting shortcomings.
(10) An award under s 26 must be reasonable in all the circumstances.
These propositions indicate that the courts have to be persuaded that 
there is a real need to depart from the equal sharing regime to provide 
for children of the relationship. The main purpose of the Act is to divide 
the property of the spouses or partners between them. The parties should 
then be entrusted to care and provide for their children as best they 
can. Only where that trust is not justified, whether for reasons within 
or beyond the parties’ control, has the court been willing to intervene 
to protect the interests of children. 
Even if the need to protect children has been made out, an order settling 
property on them tends to be a last resort, because it is in the nature of 
an expropriation.106 Other less draconian measures are preferred, such as 
postponing the vesting of relationship property or an occupation order 
until the children cease to be dependent. The courts place great weight 
on the main purpose of the Act by making every effort to ensure that the 
interests of children impact to the least extent possible on the property 
entitlements of the parties to the relationship. 
In WMM v SJM, for example, the complex and high needs of the wife’s 
daughter, the wife’s sole responsibility for her daughter’s care and her 
own poor health, as well as her injection of inherited funds into the 
purchase of the family home, were not sufficient to deprive the husband 
106 S v C (1998) 17 FRNZ 176.
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of any part of his relationship property entitlement.107 While the Court 
acknowledged the real difficulties that the wife would face moving her 
daughter to alternative accommodation, the only concession it made 
was to shorten significantly the relevant period for the husband’s claim 
for post-separation occupational rent.108 
The courts’ self-imposed constraint on their power to settle property 
for the benefit of children of the relationship is well established, even 
though there is nothing in s 26 to support such a restrictive view of the 
power. It severely limits the court’s discretion and does not sit well with 
the direction in the first part of s 26(1) or the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.109 As the constraint is a judicial gloss on the section, there 
is scope for a more liberal approach that provides better protection for 
minor or dependent children of the relationship whilst not losing sight 
of the parties’ rights to a just division. 
B Section 26A 
Section 26A empowers the court to postpone the vesting of any share 
in the relationship property, either wholly or in part, until a specified 
future date or the occurrence of a specified event. Strangely, given the 
more limited nature of this power as compared to the power in s 26, 
s 26A has very strict criteria. It can be exercised only if the court is satisfied 
that immediate vesting would cause undue hardship for a spouse or 
partner who is the principal provider of ongoing daily care for one or 
more minor or dependent children of the relationship. Furthermore, an 
order postponing vesting may be made only for as long as necessary and 
only to the extent necessary to alleviate the undue hardship.
This section was inserted into the Act in 2001 to clarify the availability 
of this power.110 Unlike s 26, s 26A also clarifies that the power can be 
exercised only where there are  minor or dependent children. 
The purpose of s 26A is to enable the primary caregiver of children of 
the relationship to look after those children. Where both parties share 
the care of the children, as in De Malmanche v De Malmanche, the court 
has no jurisdiction to make the order.111 
It is up to the primary caregiver to prove that undue hardship would 
arise if sharing was not postponed. The threshold is high.112 The focus 
generally is on the applicant’s financial circumstances and the socio-
economic consequences of not granting the order, such as the effect on 
the children’s schooling and social environment if they were required 
107 WMM v SJM [2012] NZFC 5091.
108 The wife has lodged an appeal, which Heath J labeled as not hopeless, 
though somewhat of an uphill struggle: SJM v WMM [2012] NZHC 2659.
109 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 3 and Art 27 
are especially relevant.
110 Section 33(3)(d) was used in the past to postpone vesting: Evans v Evans 
FC Whangarei FP29/94, 17 January 1996.
111 De Malmanche v De Malmanche [2002] NZLR 838.
112 Hammond v Hardy [2007] NZFLR 910 (HC) at [114].
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to move.113 The respondent’s circumstances may also be relevant. 
In RH v AF, for example, the respondent was a committed mental 
patient and in E v W the respondent was in prison.114 Neither respondent 
had immediate need of the property and their absence meant that 
the applicants had sole responsibility for the parties’ children. Any 
misconduct by the respondent is not relevant unless there is some 
causal connection between that misconduct and the undue hardship 
that the applicant will suffer if vesting is not postponed. Section 26A is 
not to be used to punish the respondent, but to address the applicant’s 
circumstances.
The high threshold may explain the small number of cases where orders 
under s 26A have been sought and made since the 2001 amendments 
came into force: only four orders out of a total of 13 applications. One of 
the reasons for the courts’ reluctance to postpone vesting may be found 
in Priestley J’s observation about social change in Hammond v Hardy:115
In the 1960s and 1970s, agreements were relatively commonplace whereby 
the primary caregiver and children would remain in a family home with 
its sale being delayed until certain stipulated events occurred. Social 
conditions, however, have changed with geographic relocation and 
relatively rapid re-partnering in the wake of broken relationships being 
commonplace.
The current global financial crisis and the consequential downturn in 
the economy creates another social change that may impact on a primary 
caregiver’s ability to care for the children of the relationship and justify 
the postponement of sharing. 
C	 Occupation	orders
Section 27(1) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 gives the court power 
to grant a spouse or partner the right to personally occupy the family 
home that forms part of the relationship property. Section 28A mandates 
the court to have “particular regard” to the accommodation needs of 
the couple’s minor or dependent children. That obligation also accords 
with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as noted in Hislop v 
Hislop.116 In about 50 per cent of the cases decided since 2002 the needs 
of children of the relationship were the principal reason for granting 
occupation to the applicant spouse or partner.117 In the other cases the 
personal needs of the applicant118 or requirements relating to the property 
justified the order.119 Where the order is made to provide accommodation 
for minor or dependent children, the duration of the order is often 
113 S v W HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-4494, 27 February 2009.
114 RH v AF FC Auckland FAM-2005-004-1312, 27 January 2006; E v W (2006) 
26 FRNZ 38.
115 Hammond v Hardy [2007] NZFLR 910 at [114].
116 Hislop v Hislop (2004) 23 FRNZ 710 at [7].
117 Nicola Peart “Occupation orders under the PRA” [2011] NZLJ 356.
118 For example, Rawlings v Rawlings [2009] NZFLR 643.
119 For example, B v B HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-378, 20 March 2007.
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linked to the social and educational needs of the children. Even then, the 
duration of the order is seldom longer than a year or two.120
As with other orders for the benefit of children, the courts exercise 
restraint in making occupation orders. They tie up the capital for the 
duration of the order and prevent the parties from moving on. Shared 
parenting and accommodation needs of new partnerships are also 
reasons for not granting occupation orders.121 
D	 Representation	of	children	in	relationship	property	proceedings
Section 37A Property (Relationships) Act gives the court the power 
to appoint a lawyer to represent minor or dependent children of the 
relationship in proceedings under the Act, but only if the court is of the 
view that special circumstances make the appointment necessary or 
desirable. This power is seldom utilised. L v P, discussed above, is one of 
the few examples where independent counsel was appointed to represent 
the couple’s infant daughter because her father’s misappropriation 
of her inheritance affected the parties’ relationship property. Without 
independent representation, minor or dependent children’s interests 
are easily overlooked unless it is in the interests of one of the parties to 
place those interests before the court. The obligation in Art 12(2) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child to give the child the opportunity 
to be heard in proceedings affecting the child is rarely seen as relevant 
in relationship property proceedings.
In the past, the court could also order that the lawyer’s fee and expenses 
be paid out of public money, rather than by either or both of the parties to 
the proceedings.122 That power was repealed with effect from 2 September 
2013.123 The inability to charge the costs to the State may make the court 
reluctant to appoint a lawyer to represent the children. It may prevent 
the court from hearing argument on the child’s perspective and prevent 
the child from having the opportunity to be heard, in breach of Article 
12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
120 In a review of cases decided between 2002 and 2011 occupation orders 
were made in 18 cases. In five of those cases the duration of the orders 
ranged from 4 to 22 months. S v W HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-4494, 27 
February 2009 was exceptional with an order for 5 years. In Mark v Mark 
[2004] NZFLR 72; (2003) 23 FRNZ 128 the wife was granted occupation of 
the home for as long as she had the care of the couple’s severely disabled 
daughter. In PEL v FFB [2012] NZFC 9534 the Court granted the wife 
occupation for four years until the couple’s youngest child completed 
year 12 at school. The wife was effectively a solo parent. The husband 
lived in Singapore and had little contact with the children.
121 Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relationship Property in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) 11.4.1. For example, JKK v LDK [2005] 
NZFLR 881.
122 Property (Relationships) Act s 37A(2).
123 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2013.
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VI Conclusion
The Property (Relationships) Act directs the courts to consider the 
interests of children of the relationship. That mandate reflects New 
Zealand’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Yet, children’s interests play only a minor role in relationship 
property disputes.124 Their interests are subservient to the main purpose 
of the Act, which is to divide relationship property between the parties 
to the relationship. Relationship property is seen as belonging to the 
parties and theirs to share. Apart from applications for orders for the 
benefit of children, the interests of children are seldom mentioned.125 Even 
when considering orders for the benefit of children, the courts are rarely 
persuaded to depart from the Act’s main purpose. Assets transferred 
into trust for the benefit of the parties and their children are not exempt 
from the Act’s purpose and policy either. 
Equal sharing of relationship property is such a dominant feature that 
the impact on children is easily overlooked or ignored. The assumption 
appears to be that children’s interests can be safely entrusted to their 
parents. The reality may be rather different. In breach of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the children’s voice will not be 
heard unless it serves the interests of one of the parties to the proceedings 
or the court becomes aware of the need to take their interests into account. 
However, the power to appoint a lawyer to represent the children 
is limited and the repeal of the power to charge the costs of such an 
appointment to the State could futher marginalise children’s interests in 
relationship property proceedings. While there is scope within the Act 
to consider children’s interests more widely than the courts currently 
do, legislative reform may be needed if children’s interests are to be 
taken seriously.126
124 Skellern, n 2 at 5.
125 DPC v PMB [2013] NZFC 1105 is a notable exception where the application 
under s 33 to sell the home was declined in the interests of the children.
126 For proposed reforms see Skellern, n 2.
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